



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25882
4 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 27 MAY 1993 FROM THE SECRETARY-GENERAL
ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

As you are aware, my Special Representative for Angola, Ms. Margaret Anstee, expressed the wish some time ago to be released from her responsibilities. I have reluctantly agreed to accede to her wishes and she will conclude her assignment shortly.

I should like to take this opportunity to express my profound appreciation for Ms. Anstee's dedicated service to the cause of peace and reconciliation in Angola. Her deep knowledge of the Angolan situation, her competence and professionalism have been valuable assets in the United Nations effort to facilitate a peaceful resolution of the conflict in that country.

Following consultations, I intend, at the conclusion of Ms. Anstee's term, to appoint Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, former Minister for Foreign Affairs of Mali, as my Special Representative for Angola, effective 28 June 1993.

I should be grateful if you could bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(Signed) Boutros BOUTROS-GHALI



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4 June 1993

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LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY
COUNCIL ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to inform you that your letter dated 27 May 1993 concerning the appointment of a new Special Representative for Angola has been brought to the attention of the members of the Council. They welcome your decision.

At the same time, members of the Council wish to take this opportunity to express their appreciation to Ms. Margaret Anstee for the courage and untiring dedication she has shown as your Special Representative in Angola, in especially difficult circumstances.

(Signed) Juan Antonio YAÑEZ-BARNUEVO
President of the
Security Council



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4 June 1993

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LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1993 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF SAUDI ARABIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith a list of assistance provided by the
Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Somalia.

I should be grateful if this could be circulated as a document of the
Security Council.

(Signed) Gaafar M. ALLAGANY
Ambassador

Annex

[Original: Arabic]

List of assistance provided to Somalia

1. Assistance and soft loans for development provided by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to Somalia from before the war to the present total US\$ 811,853,000, distributed as follows:

(a) Non-reimbursable assistance for different purposes to support the balance of payments, oil assistance and social, medical and Islamic assistance totalled US\$ 658,253,000;

(b) Soft loans to finance five development projects totalled US\$ 143,600,000. The Ministry of Finance has repaid US\$ 45,779,482 of the total amount lent to Somalia.

2. Since the civil war began, assistance has taken the following forms:

(a) Foodstuffs worth US\$ 10 million were shipped in October 1992. There were two shipments, one of 4,323 tons and the second of 2,500 tons, and they were sent through the World Food Programme (WFP);

(b) Foodstuffs worth US\$ 5 million were sent (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia sent this contribution through the World Food Programme (WFP));

(c) The Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, King Fahd Bin Abdul-Aziz Al Saud, personally contributed US\$ 5 million to alleviate the food shortage suffered by the Somali people;

(d) The Saudi Government provided 5,000 cases of foodstuffs, which were sent through the High Committee responsible for collecting donations for the Muslims of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia.

3. As at 12 November 1992, donations collected for Somalis by the above-mentioned High Committee totalled 49,741,712.97 riyals, of which 24,172,508.97 riyals have so far been spent (1 US dollar = 3.75 Saudi riyals).



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4 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF CROATIA TO THE UNITED
NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

I have the honour to submit, enclosed herewith, a letter by the President of the Republic of Croatia, Dr. Franjo Tudjman, addressed to you.

I would be grateful if you would provide for the distribution of this letter and its annex as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mario NOBILO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Letter dated 3 June 1993 from the President of the Republic of
Croatia addressed to the Secretary-General

The Republic of Croatia is grateful to the United Nations and to you personally for all the efforts made so far, and currently being continued, to stop the war and promote the peace process in Croatia. At this time, when decisions are being made regarding the extension of the mandate and the authority of UNPROFOR in the Republic of Croatia, as well as regarding further measures to stop the war and implement the peace plan in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I am addressing you in order to prevent the further deterioration of the situation and bring about a peaceful solution.

1. Serbian aggression against the Republic of Croatia, a Member State of the United Nations, is continuing in the UNPAs. Armed provocations and attacks on Croatian cities (Zadar, Biograd, Sibenik, Gospić) have intensified in recent days, accompanied by destruction of civil targets and loss of human life. At the same time, the local population in the UNPAs is being terrorized on an ever increasing scale, Croats and other non-Serbian residents are being detained and maltreated, the most active perpetrators of such actions being volunteers from Serbia whose number amounts to several thousands in all sectors.

The Serbian side has unilaterally broken off the negotiations between the representatives of the local Serbs and the representatives of the Government of the Republic of Croatia. The president of the self-proclaimed Assembly of the so-called "Republic of Serbian Krajina", Mr. Mile Paspalj has convened a session of the "Krajina Parliament" on Saturday, 5 June 1993, in Petrinja, to discuss, among other matters, the scheduling of a referendum on "the integration of the Republic of Serbian Krajina with the Republic of Srpska and other Serbian lands". This is a call for integration with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, i.e. Serbia and Montenegro, in other words, the creation of a "Greater-Serbia".

The aggressive policy of Belgrade and the ringleaders of the Serbian rebellion in the Republic of Croatia is obviously intensifying, as manifested significantly by the total non-acceptance and rejection of all relevant United Nations resolutions, and of the international legal order, aimed at absorbing parts of the territory of two sovereign United Nations Member States, the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Quite obviously, such a position is totally unacceptable to the Republic of Croatia, as it is contrary to the United Nations Charter and all relevant Security Council resolutions, and particularly to Security Council resolution 815 (1993) which stipulates that the UNPAs are integral parts of the territory of the Republic of Croatia.

2. Louder and louder demands are being heard, including statements made in the Assembly of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, calling for the re-occupation of Prevlaka, which do not contribute to the appeasement of

/...

the situation, but, rather, constitute open threats and territorial pretensions towards the Republic of Croatia.

3. The dramatic situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina is also deteriorating, battles are being fought which are resulting in scores of military and civilian casualties, and there are ever more casualties among members of relief organizations and UNPROFOR troops. The established humanitarian corridors are not being respected and, in spite of all the efforts of the international community, humanitarian aid is not reaching its destinations regularly.

In view of the foregoing, and particularly in the absence of effective decisions by the international community to implement the United Nations Security Council resolutions, adopted thus far, we are deeply concerned about further possible developments of the situation. In accordance with the goal of Croatian policy to the aggression and the creation of conditions for the achievement of peace - we resolutely urge as follows:

- (a) In accordance with United Nations Security Council resolution 769 (1992), as well as resolutions 757 (1992), 787 (1992) and 820 (1993) regarding sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, it is necessary to establish without delay international control and securing of the international borders between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) which adjoin the UNPAs.
- (b) Concerning the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the unfounded accusations that Croatia is involved in the internal conflicts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, we suggest that UNPROFOR take effective control and secure all the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This means that we also accept, within the framework of the control of all borders of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the international control of the entire border between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and not only those adjoining the UNPAs.

I am convinced that the control of borders is an indispensable and crucial step towards ending the war and the aggression and achieving a peaceful solution subsequent to the Security Council resolutions. Let me assure Your Excellency that Croatia is prepared to implement, as soon as possible, all relevant Security Council resolutions in order to establish a lasting and stable peace in the territory of the former Yugoslavia. In spite of all the gravity and tragedy of the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia cannot and must not be a hostage to these events, but the international community should actively seek a solution to the crucial issue of the UNPAs in Croatia and the militant conduct of the rebellious Serbs of these areas. I believe that this issue could be resolved separately from the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the successful implementation of the Vance plan in the UNPAs will have a strategically positive impact on promoting the comprehensive implementation of the Vance-Owen plan in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Croatia will be prepared to accept the extension of the UNPROFOR mandate based on clear guidelines for the implementation of the Vance plan and of the relevant Security Council resolutions.

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English
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Your role, Your Excellency, in the resolution of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is of the utmost importance. In order to witness the seriousness of the events in the Republic of Croatia, and to familiarize yourself on the spot with the realistic possibilities for a peaceful solution to the benefit of all its citizens, you are cordially invited to visit the Republic of Croatia. You are most welcome here, and your visit would surely contribute greatly to a resolution of these issues.

President of the Republic of Croatia
Dr. Franjo Tudjman



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S/25886
5 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 4 JUNE 1993 FROM THE ACTING PERMANENT
REPRESENTATIVE OF VIET NAM TO THE UNITED NATIONS
ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the statement dated 3 June 1993 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam concerning the 23-28 May 1993 general elections for a constitutional national assembly in Cambodia.

I should be very grateful if you could have the enclosed statement circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Le V. BANG
Ambassador
Acting Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam

The general election for the Constitutional National Assembly in Cambodia organized and supervised by the United Nations in conformity with the Paris Agreement on the comprehensive political settlement for the Cambodian conflict took place from 23 to 28 May 1993. The general election proceeded in a relatively calm and orderly atmosphere. In spite of deliberate attempt by the Khmer Rouge to sabotage the election, the voter turnout was nearly 90 per cent. That reflects the Cambodian people's desire to have, at an early date, peace, stability and national concord in order to build a prosperous country and a happy life after the ravages of wars and genocide. Favourable developments in connection with this election also reflect the great determination and efforts by the United Nations and the signatories to the Paris Agreement in promoting the peace process in Cambodia.

As Cambodia's close neighbour and a signatory to the Paris Agreement, the Vietnamese Government and people follow the election with great interest and, together with world public opinion, hope that the election will create good conditions for the Cambodian people to build a peaceful, independent, neutral and non-aligned country which entertains friendly relations with all countries. The Vietnamese Government and people, once again, call upon the international community and the Cambodian parties concerned to make additional contributions to the process so that Cambodia can soon have peace and stability in the interests of the Cambodian people and others in the region.

On this occasion, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam reaffirms its consistent policy to scrupulously observe the Paris Agreement, fully respect Cambodia's independence, sovereignty and the Cambodian people's right to decide their own destiny. The Vietnamese Government and people wish to maintain and develop good-neighbourly relations with Cambodia on the basis of the principles of peaceful coexistence, non-interference into each other's internal affairs and mutually beneficial cooperation in the interests of the respective countries, and those of peace and stability in South-East Asia and the rest of the world.

In this connection, the Government of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam expresses its willingness to recognize a new government in Cambodia to be elected by a Constitutional National Assembly and its desire to consolidate and broaden relations of friendship and cooperation in the spirit of the January 1992 Vietnamese-Cambodian Joint Communiqué.

Hanoi, 3 June 1993



Security Council

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S/25887
5 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
ITALY TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions by my Government I wish to inform you that Italy joins Pakistan in requesting an immediate meeting of the Security Council to discuss the armed attack against Pakistani peace forces in Somalia which resulted in the death of at least 18 Pakistani soldiers.

Should the Security Council decide to hold an open debate on this tragic event, Italy asks you to take the floor according to the rules of procedure of the Council.

(Signed) Ambassador Francesco P. FULCI
Permanent Representative of Italy
to the United Nations



Security Council

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S/25888
6 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 5 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
PAKISTAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Under instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request an
urgent meeting of the Security Council to discuss the recent developments in
Somalia.

(Signed) Jamsheed K. A. MARKER
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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S/25889
6 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Draft resolution

The Security Council,

Reaffirming its resolutions 733 (1992) of 23 January 1992, 746 (1992) of 17 March 1992, 751 (1992) of 24 April 1992, 767 (1992) of 27 July 1992, 775 (1992) of 28 August 1992, 794 (1992) of 3 December 1992 and 814 (1993) of 26 March 1993,

Bearing in mind General Assembly resolution 47/167 of 18 December 1992,

Gravely alarmed at the premeditated armed attacks launched by forces apparently belonging to the United Somali Congress (USC/SNA) against the personnel of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) on 5 June 1993,

Strongly condemning such actions, which directly undermine international efforts aimed at the restoration of peace and normalcy in Somalia,

Expressing outrage at the loss of life as a result of these criminal attacks,

Reaffirming its commitment to assist the people of Somalia in re-establishing conditions of normal life,

Stressing that the international community is involved in Somalia in order to help the people of Somalia who have suffered untold miseries due to years of civil strife in that country,

Acknowledging the fundamental importance of completing the comprehensive and effective programme for disarming all Somali parties, including movements and factions,

Convinced that the restoration of law and order throughout Somalia would contribute to humanitarian relief operations, reconciliation and political settlement, as well as to the rehabilitation of Somalia's political institutions and economy,

Condemning strongly the use of radio broadcasts, in particular by the USC/SNA, to incite attacks against United Nations personnel,

Recalling the statement made by its President on 31 March 1993 (S/25493) concerning the safety of United Nations forces and personnel deployed in conditions of strife and committed to consider promptly measures appropriate to the particular circumstances to ensure that persons responsible for attacks and other acts of violence against United Nations forces and personnel are held to account for their actions,

Taking note of the information provided to the Council by the Secretary-General on 6 June 1993,

Determining that the situation in Somalia continues to threaten peace and security in the region,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Strongly condemns the unprovoked armed attacks against the personnel of UNOSOM II on 5 June 1993, which appear to have been part of a calculated and premeditated series of cease-fire violations to prevent by intimidation UNOSOM II from carrying out its mandate as provided for in resolution 814 (1993);
2. Expresses its condolences to the Government and people of Pakistan and the families of the UNOSOM II personnel who have lost their lives;
3. Re-emphasizes the crucial importance of the early implementation of the disarmament of all Somali parties, including movements and factions, in accordance with paragraphs 56-69 of the report of the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993 (S/25354), and of neutralizing radio broadcasting systems that contribute to the violence and attacks directed against UNOSOM II;
4. Demands once again that all Somali parties, including movements and factions, comply fully with the commitments they have undertaken in the agreements they concluded at the informal Preparatory Meeting on Somali Political Reconciliation in Addis Ababa, and in particular with their Agreement on Implementing the Cease-fire and on Modalities of Disarmament (S/25168, annex III);
5. Reaffirms that the Secretary-General is authorized under resolution 814 (1993) to take all necessary measures against all those responsible for the armed attacks referred to in paragraph 1 above, including against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks, to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia, including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment;
6. Requests the Secretary-General urgently to inquire into the incident, with particular emphasis on the role of those factional leaders involved;
7. Encourages the rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men, all ranks, as well as equipment, as indicated in the Secretary-General's report of 3 March 1993 (S/25354);

8. Urges Member States to contribute, on an emergency basis, military support and transportation, including armoured personnel carriers, tanks and attack helicopters, to provide UNOSOM II the capability appropriately to confront and deter armed attacks directed against it in the accomplishment of its mandate;

9. Further requests the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Council on the implementation of the present resolution, if possible within seven days from the date of its adoption;

10. Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.



General Assembly
Security Council

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S/25890
7 June 1993
ENGLISH
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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 71 of the preliminary list*
GENERAL AND COMPLETE DISARMAMENT

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 28 May 1993 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of
the Permanent Mission of Nicaragua to the United Nations
addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement issued on 15 April 1993 by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Nicaragua concerning the decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the text of this letter and its annex circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under item 71 of the preliminary list, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Erich VILCHEZ ASHER
Minister Counsellor
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Statement issued on 15 April 1993 by the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs of Nicaragua concerning the decision of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons

Nicaragua strongly supports all measures that strengthen international peace and security. In this regard, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons helps to create stability and a climate of confidence and security at both the regional and global levels.

The decision of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to withdraw from the Treaty has elicited various reactions, including a joint declaration by the depositaries of the Treaty. The climate generated by that decision may affect efforts to consolidate stability and peace in the Korean Peninsula and, in particular, efforts to reunite the two Koreas.

This situation is a source of profound concern for the Government of Nicaragua, which hopes that it will be possible to arrive at a satisfactory solution within the framework of international law and, in particular, the principle of the peaceful settlement of disputes, strict compliance with international treaties and international obligations that have been assumed.

Nicaragua, in keeping with its foreign policy in support of demilitarization and the conclusion of agreements to minimize or eliminate weapons of mass destruction, hopes that all States parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons will remain legally bound to that instrument in order to promote efforts to achieve general and complete disarmament in the world.



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7 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 3 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
AZERBAIJAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of a letter dated 3 June 1993, to His Excellency Mr. Don Juan Antonio Yañez-Barnuevo, President of the Security Council of the United Nations for the month of June, addressed to him by His Excellency Mr. Tofik Gassymov, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, as received by facsimile.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Hassan A. HASSANOV
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: Russian]

Letter dated 3 June 1993 from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of
Azerbaijan addressed to the President of the Security Council

The Azerbaijani Republic welcomed the Security Council's adoption of resolution 822 (1993), regarding it as a serious and resolute measure on the part of the international community, which refuses to condone Armenia's blatant violation of the sovereignty of Azerbaijan. The resolution, which demands the "withdrawal of ... occupying forces from ... occupied areas of Azerbaijan", has made it clear to the Armenian side, which has cynically defied the entire international community, that its actions against Azerbaijan are unacceptable and inadmissible. The resolution has also inspired us with hope and optimism regarding the speedy resumption of the Minsk negotiations, so treacherously cut short by Armenian aggression and the occupation of Kelbadjar, Lachin and other areas of Azerbaijan. As one of the initiators of the negotiations within the framework of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), Azerbaijan is grateful to the Security Council and the General Assembly for their support for its peacemaking efforts in the Minsk Group.

However, I wish to express my extreme concern at the current situation. Exactly one month has elapsed since the adoption of Security Council resolution 822 (1993) but, to our great regret and disappointment, the steps undertaken by Azerbaijan in cooperation with the countries members of the Minsk Group have not had the desired effect.

The efforts of three States - the United States of America, Russia and Turkey - to carry out their initiative, which would make possible the step-by-step implementation of Security Council decisions and the resumption of the Minsk process, have been roundly rejected by the Armenian side.

Twice - on 6 and 26 May - the Azerbaijani Republic, desiring a peaceful settlement of the question of occupation, gave its consent to the schedule of urgent measures proposed by the three countries, despite the fact that the schedule contains a number of unsatisfactory elements. However, on both occasions, the Armenian side rejected the opportunity to find a way out of the impasse into which it had driven itself. I cannot refrain from pointing out that the unilateral cease-fire declared by Azerbaijan and which began on 24 May, was grossly violated by the shelling of the Sadarak (Nakhichevan) and Fizuli districts of Azerbaijan.

Armenia's intentions are clear and self-evident. Having created a powerful military base in the territory of Azerbaijan and having expanded its position of strength through the seizure and occupation of an increasing number of districts of Azerbaijan, the Armenian side, resorting to various pretexts, conditions and other subterfuges and taking advantage of the obvious weakness of CSCE mechanisms, is dragging out the process and using the time so gained to consolidate its military positions and preserve the status quo.

Such failures and delays create a dangerous vacuum. I should also like to state that there is a limit to Azerbaijan's willingness to seek a compromise.

We appreciate the efforts of the United States, Russia and Turkey, and also the chairman of the Minsk Group, to find a "peaceful" way of implementing Security Council resolution 822 (1993). However, that gives rise to the dangerous tendency of conducting negotiations on Security Council decisions that have already been discussed and adopted and which all parties are bound to implement. I am afraid that this quagmire will also engulf Council resolution 822 (1993); at the same time, the resolution deals with extremely pressing problems. I am not very optimistic about the forthcoming meeting of mediators in Rome, since their two previous efforts were complete failures.

The fragile peace process has been dealt a fair number of blows, and the next one may destroy what little has been achieved.

While a political settlement does not permit military operations, it does not rule out the use of pressure and force.

I believe that the current situation calls for the intervention of the Security Council which, in its resolution 822 (1993), decided "to remain actively seized of the matter" and requested "the Secretary-General ... to assess the situation in the region". Urgent measures must be taken to implement Council resolution 822 (1993), which would make it possible to return to the situation prevailing prior to the occupation of Kelbadjar and give CSCE an opportunity to continue the peace process.

Tofik GASSYMOV
Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the Azerbaijani Republic



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7 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF ALBANIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT
OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to report the following to Your Excellency:

It has become known from various sources that the ongoing negotiations aimed at finding a permanent denomination for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia will, most likely, lead to the adoption of the name "Slavo-Macedonia".

The Albanians of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have strongly opposed the name "Slavo-Macedonia" because it openly ignores the existence there of a very strong Albanian community which makes up nearly 40 per cent of the entire population of that country. Actually Albanians in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia have never been treated, in many respects, on an equal footing with the Slav population of that Republic. And now attempts are being made to sanction this fact in the very name of the country, in which they have been living for centuries as an autochthonous people.

That is why the Albanians of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia consider the proposed name as unacceptable and humiliating, and their deputies to the Parliament of that Republic, as well as all their political forces and parties, have firmly denounced it.

Owing to the historical inexactitude and the negative political implications of the suggested name, the Government of the Republic of Albania associates itself with the Albanians of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and their representatives in decidedly objecting to the name "Slavo-Macedonia".

I would be grateful, Mr. President, if you could have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thanas SHKURTI
Ambassador

Permanent Representative



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7 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
MALAYSIA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

I am pleased to transmit to you herewith the text of the statement that my delegation had intended to deliver during the deliberations of the Security Council at its 3228th meeting, held on 4 June 1993, on the situation in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) RAZALI Ismail
Permanent Representative

Annex

Statement by the Permanent Representative of Malaysia
to the United Nations

It has been very painful for my Government and the people of Malaysia to see that, after over a year now, the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina continues to deteriorate. Acts of aggression and atrocities by the Serbs against the civilian population in that country, in particular the Bosnian Muslims, are rampant.

While my delegation welcomes the good intentions of previous resolutions on Bosnia and Herzegovina adopted by the Security Council, it is regrettable that all those resolutions have yet to achieve the desired objectives, primarily owing to the lack of political commitments on the part of the Security Council. It is the view of my delegation that all the resolutions on Bosnia adopted by the Security Council so far still lack the means and enforcement provisions to implement them. This explains why the Serbs continue to make a mockery of international law and continue to ignore Security Council resolutions.

The draft resolution on safe areas for action before the Security Council would not restore peace and the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Even as an immediate and temporary measure, the draft resolution, in our view, still has serious shortcomings:

(a) It does not establish a time-frame for these safe areas. The question that arises is "how temporary is temporary". Without any clear time-frame, the temporary measures could well lead to the creation of "permanent ethnic reservations" or "Muslim ghettos" under the protection of the United Nations, allowing the Serbs and Croats to consolidate their control of territories acquired by force and would be tantamount to acceptance of the consequences of the abhorrent policy of ethnic cleansing of the aggressors;

(b) It does not address the question of lifting the arms embargo and recognizing the right to self-defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as provided for in the Charter of the United Nations;

(c) It does not apply the safe-areas concept broadly enough to defend all threatened population centres, including those under Serbian and Croatian control;

(d) It does not address the question of control/neutralization of heavy weapons and the relocation of such weapons to target other population centres which have not been designated as "safe areas";

(e) It does not address the restoration of normalcy, including infrastructure, water and electrical supply in the safe areas.

In view of the foregoing, my delegation regards the draft resolution as another "false solution" in dealing with the grave situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and it reflects once again the failure to fulfil obligations as stipulated in Article 24 of the Charter of the United Nations, which is to take

prompt and effective measures to restore peace. It is the view of my delegation that the credibility of the whole question of the future of the United Nations collective system is at stake in the light of repeated failure to take decisive enforcement actions.

It is clear now that nothing short of enforcement action is required to save the Muslims of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Since diplomatic efforts have failed to inject sanity and reason on the Serbs, the only credible response available is the use of force under Chapter VII of the Charter. Such action must be taken now before the Muslims in that country are totally annihilated.

In the absence of any decisive international action against Serbian aggression, Malaysia urges the Security Council to lift the arms embargo against Bosnia and Herzegovina so that arms could be supplied to the Bosnian Muslims to arm themselves against Serbian aggression. Malaysia has always held the view that the United Nations embargo against the former Yugoslavia is clearly meant for the aggressors and it should not have the effect of denying the right of self-defence to the victims of aggression. It is unjust and unlawful to allow the situation to continue uncorrected when the Serbs are so heavily armed and are getting constant supplies, whereas the Bosnian Muslims are at the mercy of the murderous Serbian forces denied by the Council their inherent right to self-defence.

In conclusion, Malaysia on its part stands ready to contribute troops in support of any collective action under the auspices of the United Nations.



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7 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 7 JUNE 1993 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to communicate the following:

The Security Council has decided on a wide range of measures against Serbia and Montenegro. The Slovak Republic is fully committed to implement all the resolutions of the Security Council.

As a Danube country and a directly affected Member State of the United Nations the Slovak Republic is confronted with serious economic problems arising from carrying out the measures set out in the relevant Security Council resolutions.

Therefore, invoking Article 50 of the Charter of the United Nations, the Government of the Slovak Republic wishes to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution to these problems.

I would appreciate if you could kindly inform the members of the Security Council about the aforementioned intention of my Government and have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Eduard KUKAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



General Assembly
Security Council

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16 June 1993

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-eighth session
Item 38 of the preliminary list*
POLICIES OF APARTHEID OF THE
GOVERNMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-eighth year

Letter dated 2 June 1993 from the Chairman of the
Special Committee against Apartheid addressed to
the Secretary-General

I have the pleasure and honour to enclose herewith the report of the mission to South Africa undertaken by a delegation of the Special Committee against Apartheid from 1 to 11 March 1993 (see annex). The mission took place in accordance with the Special Committee's programme of work for 1993.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 38, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Ibrahim A. GAMBARI
Chairman
Special Committee against
Apartheid

* A/48/50.

ANNEX

Special Committee against Apartheid

Report of the Chairman of the Special Committee
against Apartheid on his Mission to South Africa,
1 to 11 March 1993

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I. INTRODUCTION

1. At its sixteenth special session on 12-14 December 1989, the General Assembly adopted by consensus the Declaration on Apartheid and its Destructive Consequences in Southern Africa.¹ This historic document was a milestone in the international solidarity against the system of apartheid in South Africa and has been providing the overall guidelines for the international community in its efforts to assist eliminating apartheid in South Africa. The declaration has become, in essence, the internationally accepted yardstick for assessment of the progress made in South Africa towards the establishment of a united, non-racial and democratic society.

2. While 1991 witnessed some positive changes in South Africa, including the repeal of key apartheid legislation,² some deeply disturbing problems resulting from decades of apartheid continued to affect political developments in South Africa. Those were mainly related to the persistent and high levels of violence, and the socio-economic disparities between Whites and the country's vast majority of Blacks.

3. One of the most significant developments of the year was the holding of the first session of the Convention for a Democratic South Africa (CODESA I) in Johannesburg on 20 and 21 December, 1991, which was attended by nineteen parties and organisations as well as numerous observers. In a referendum on 7 March 1992, President F.W. de Klerk obtained support from 68.7% of the more than 2.8 million white voters for the "continuation of the reform process which the State President began on 2 February 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiations". Following encouraging negotiations during the first couple of months of 1992 a second meeting of CODESA was held on May 15 and 16, 1992. The discussions, however, reached a deadlock mainly due to a failure to reach an agreement on a number of issues related to

the constitution-making process.

4. In the wake of the Boipatong Massacre on 17 June 1992, and at the request of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) the Security Council held a formal meeting on 16 July, and unanimously adopted resolution 765(1992), which authorized the Secretary General to urgently dispatch a Special Representative to consult with the parties in South Africa, in order to recommend measures that would assist in bringing an effective end to the violence and in creating conditions for negotiations. As a result of recommendations made by the Secretary General on the basis of findings by his Special Representative,³ the Security Council authorized the establishment of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa (UNOMSA). Its deployment started in September and had reached full strength at the end of November.

5. While the increasing levels of violence were acknowledged to be a serious impediment to meaningful negotiations, renewed contacts between the Government and African National Congress (ANC) led to a high level meeting between Mr. Nelson Mandela and Mr. F.W. de Klerk on 26 September 1992. The meeting resulted in a Record of Understanding, which in addition to the release of remaining prisoners, also reflected agreement on a number of other outstanding issues including those relating to the constitution-making process, the carrying and displaying of dangerous weapons on public occasions and to the fencing of a number of hostels. Also other bilateral contacts took place between parties involved. These included meetings held in Nigeria and Botswana between the Government and the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC) which laid the foundations for further negotiations in South Africa and the resumption of multi-party negotiations with the participation of PAC.

6. In May 1992, the Special Committee against Apartheid had sought to promote a more comprehensive understanding of the serious

and potentially destabilizing problems relating to the glaring socio-economic inequalities, by organizing a seminar in Windhoek. The seminar brought together a wide range of sectors in South Africa, including liberation movements, academic institutions, business and labour, and representatives of United Nations bodies and agencies.

7. Towards the end of 1992 several complex and inter-linked factors, such as the widespread violence, the continued economic down-turn and the festering socio-economic developments had led to a recognition that a resumption of multi-party negotiations was urgently needed as the only way to achieve a united, non-racial and democratic South Africa. In order to obtain a first-hand understanding of these factors and the political process under way in South Africa, as well as an understanding of how that process could be further encouraged and of the role which the international community could play in that respect, the Special Committee against Apartheid included in its work programme for 1993 a mission of consultations to South Africa. The mission took place from 1 to 11 March 1993.

8. The mission was led by the Chairman of the Special Committee against Apartheid, Professor Ibrahim A. Gambari, Permanent Representative of Nigeria to the United Nations and composed of Ambassador Victor H. Batiouk, Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations and Vice-Chairman of the Special Committee, Mr. Suresh K. Goel (India), Rapporteur of the Special Committee, Mr. Garaudy Laguerre (Haiti) and Mr. Abdullahi A. Omaki (Nigeria). Mr. Johan Nordenfelt, Director of the Centre against Apartheid and Ms. Shenaz Nagji, also from the Centre, accompanied the mission. The mission established contact and held broad-based consultations with high-ranking representatives of major parties in the current political process towards peaceful change and the full elimination of the apartheid system, and with a wide range of civic, religious, business, labour and media leaders, as well as with various non-

governmental organizations and academic institutions.

9. A schedule of meetings held in South Africa is annexed to the present report (see appendix).

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MISSION

Various aspects relating to violence:

10. Discussions with various parties and groups confirmed that a substantial degree of violence arises out of political factors. A very high level of violence is due to socio-economic causes and also to ordinary criminal patterns. Statistics compiled by the National Peace Committee for the period January - October 1992 indicate that deaths and serious incidents of violence attributed to political motives ranged between 7000 - 11000 and 15000 respectively. On the other hand, in the case of other violence than political for the same period, South Africa had 30,000 deaths, 115,000 serious crimes, 500,000 incidents of house-breaking and 120,000 incidents of armed robberies. The statistics given by the South African Police (SAP) indicated that there had been about 18,000 murders in South Africa in 1992 out of which 2400 were politically related, and figures made available to the mission by the Human Rights Commission indicate that murders committed with a political motive represented 13% of all deaths in the period January-October 1992. While there are discrepancies due to differences in methods, areas and time frames covered by figures given, the pattern appeared to indicate that violence attributed to other than political motives, has assumed an even more serious dimension than political violence. However, the latter, although in pronounced decline over the last couple of months, continues to mar efforts to create an atmosphere conducive to peaceful political activities.

11. Although levels of political violence are reported to be particularly high in Natal/Kwazulu, in the Vaal area and in the Ciskei/Border areas, its occurrence is widespread and leaves few areas untouched. A widely held view is that the violence can be turned on or off at will; each time political progress seems to be about to be achieved violence erupts distracting major players and threatening to derail the process. Whereas the most important source of political violence was seen by some to be the rivalry for political control in certain areas, others ascribed it to clandestine activities by parts of the security forces, working in collusion with white right wing groupings, or certain homeland police forces. Concern was expressed on the existence of a large number of unlicensed fire arms as well as some 2.5 million licensed weapons in the possession of individuals potentially involved in private army activities. Additionally, the smuggling of arms and weapons into South Africa, could aggravate the fragile situation in the country. Actions by certain security force units, such as 31 Battalion and Koevoet, the lack of fencing at a number of hostels in the Vaal area and the carrying of dangerous weapons in public were singled out by many as particularly serious obstacles to controlling the ongoing violence. While recommendations have been made by Judge Goldstone to fence a defined number of hostels and to disallow the carrying of Hose weapons in public, and there was an understanding between ANC and the South African Government to that effect, resistance from the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) and threats by hostel dwellers were cited as grounds for the apparent unwillingness of the South African Government to take the necessary actions in this regard, limiting the possibilities to achieve a solution to these problems. The announced disbanding of 31 Battalion and Koevoet was criticized as insufficient on the grounds that its members had merely been redeployed to other units; others defended the dispersal as a better alternative than leaving the members of these units unemployed and outside any control.

12. Other major factors pointed to as contributing to the

widespread violence, are the socio-economic inequalities which have led to a large scale migration of rural poor into urban areas, high levels of under-education and illiteracy and a large unemployment amongst the majority of the black population.

13. The need for proper elections to local administrating bodies in townships and rural areas was emphasized, for them to have the credibility needed to deal with problems prone to lead to violence.

14. The South African Police (SAP) has long been considered by the majority of the population as an instrument for the enforcement of Apartheid policies. Its lack of credibility in the communities worst hit by violence, and the inadequate level of police manpower were also frequently mentioned as factors which tend to worsen the existing situation.

15. Almost all groups and parties contacted tended to believe that there was a strong possibility of an increase in the violence as the date for elections drew closer. The expected increase in the violence was mostly ascribed to political competition between rival parties, and particularly to the possibility of attempts to derail the process by parties which may fear they are not able to win sufficient support in the coming one-man-one-vote election. Another reason mentioned was the above-mentioned inadequacy of resources of the police making it difficult to maintain law and order both at the upto 7,000 polling stations during the elections, and elsewhere at the same time. This problem would be exacerbated if the police were seen to be under the exclusive control of the present Government.

16. There was a general belief, including in the SAP, that there was an urgent need for their reorientation and re-training in the functions and duties of a police force in an open and democratic society. Only when the police was perceived by all citizens as a service for the protection of their rights and social peace rather

than as a force of repression would there be real hope of success in reducing crime and tackling the issue of violence in a manner both effective and politically acceptable. While the SAP is in the process of taking certain measures to promote such re-training, it was felt that the task could be more effectively executed with assistance and inputs from outside South Africa. The mission was informed that the South African Police would also start a programme of demilitarization of its organization and structure. As part of this process the present use of military ranks and titles would be changed in line with those used in many other democratic countries.

Role of the National Peace Accord Structures:

17. The National Peace Accord was signed on 14 September 1991. Among the 24 signatories were political parties and organizations, trade unions and civic organizations. The Accord, which contains a code of conduct both for the security forces and for political parties and organizations, allows for mechanisms to implement and enforce its provisions, and proposes specific measures to facilitate socio-economic reconstruction and development in the areas devastated by violence. The main structures of the National Peace Accord are:

- i) The National Peace Committee, which is chaired by Mr. John Hall, is made up of representatives of the signatories under a chairman and vice-chairman drawn from religious and business communities. It monitors and makes recommendations on the implementation of the Peace Accord.
- ii) The National Peace Secretariat, which is headed by Mr. Antonie A. Gildenhuys, is comprised of at least four persons nominated by the National Peace Committee. It establishes and coordinates regional and local dispute resolution committees.
- iii) The Commission of Inquiry regarding the Prevention of

Public Violence and Intimidation is chaired by Judge Richard Goldstone. It is a statutory body which investigates violent incidents and makes recommendations on how violence and intimidation can be prevented.

18. While it was readily admitted that the functioning of these structures had perhaps not always been perfect, and that they could be further strengthened and improved, it was generally held however, that these structures and the National Peace Accord itself had come to provide a generally acceptable framework for the overall examination of and dealing with the question of violence in South Africa. One important initiative resulting from the activities of the National Peace Committee and the National Peace Secretariat has been the setting up of regional and local peace committees. These have as members, among others, representatives of the main political parties, civic and religious organisations, tribal and local authorities and police and defence forces, in order to involve as many important actors as possible in the efforts to deal with violence at levels closer to where it occurs. Confidence-building measures of various kinds between the people, the police and defence forces and the political parties were deemed of critical importance. As socio-economic factors are important causes of violence in the South African society, it was emphasized that it was essential to provide the regional and local peace committees with adequate resources to undertake socio-economic programmes at the grassroots level. However, such funds had so far been lacking.

19. It is the impression of the mission that the Goldstone Commission is widely respected as a non-partisan and impartial body and that its investigations of public violence and its recommendations for dealing with its various aspects are largely supported, although not always acted upon by all political players. The need was often stressed for the Government to act without delay on the Goldstone Commission's recommendations regarding a ban on

the carrying of dangerous weapons in public and the fencing of a number of defined hostels.

20. Some of the political parties, including the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC) and the Conservative Party (CP), have not signed the National Peace Accord. The leaders of Transkei, Venda, Bophuthatswana, and Ciskei have also not signed the accord.

Role of International Observers:

21. The role of international observers deployed by the United Nations under Security Council Resolution 772, and by the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the European Community (EC) and the Commonwealth, and their influence in containing situations of violence, was positively commented upon by all parties, movements, non-governmental organisations, business groups and academic institutions with which the mission met. A clear indication of the positive effects attributed to the presence of international observers was the decrease in incidents of political violence over the last couple of months. However, it was felt by some important political organizations that both the number and the mandate of the observers should be expanded, so that they could play a more active and effective role in controlling and investigating violence, including examining government investigations of incidents of violence.

22. While there were mixed opinions on the usefulness and feasibility of a peace-keeping role for the United Nations, it was almost an unanimous view that the international community and, in particular, the United Nations would need to play a considerably expanded role in connection with the coming elections in South Africa both at a time of elections and during a period of a few months before the elections. The presence of international election observers would have to be on a scale commensurate with the task. It was underscored by many parties, including the

Government, that the experience of the elections in Angola must be avoided in South Africa at all costs.

Political Process:

23. When the delegation was in South Africa, there was an atmosphere of cautious optimism in spite of the many risks to the peaceful process from those who wished to derail it, that the ongoing process of peaceful political change through multi-party negotiations will achieve the goal of a democratic, non-racial and united South Africa. Most political players including the South African Government agreed that the discussions in the multi-party negotiations would lead to the establishment of a transitional executive council and elections for an interim/transition government and a constituent assembly, by April 1994 or before. There appeared to be a clear determination by the major actors to continue this political process despite several impediments, particularly those related to violence, and to overcome the frequent expressions of political intolerance.

24. The preparatory meeting for resumed multi-party negotiations was held on March 5-6, 1993. An important gain at this meeting was considered to be an understanding reached concerning a "sufficient consensus" to allow the multi-party negotiations to proceed. A significant portion of the political leadership involved indicated during discussions with the members of the mission, its determination not to allow the negotiations to be disrupted. The debate at this time seemed to focus on the type of State - the degree of devolution of powers to regional and local government and the source of residual powers - and on the extent and mandatory character of principles for the future constitution to be agreed on in advance, the type and methods of the first election, the question of control of the security forces and of maintenance of law and order prior to the elections, and on the constitutional provisions to apply until a new constitution had been adopted. The

distrust between main actors, the lack of political tolerance of many of their followers and the related questions of unimpeded access for campaign activities to all areas including the homelands, were also subjects of concern in the debate.

25. With 26 participants including PAC and the CP (compared to 19 participants at the two CODESA meetings), the participation in multi-party negotiations was seen as almost fully inclusive thus increasing the probability of the result of the negotiations being acceptable to the vast majority of political players.

Socio-Economic Situation:

26. The Special Committee against Apartheid has persistently highlighted the need for addressing the socio-economic disparities in South Africa, as an indispensable component of the process of ending the legacies of apartheid and building a stable non-racial democracy there. Some figures in a report published by the South African Institute of Race Relations in March highlight such disparities. For instance, the unemployment rate amongst blacks was 25% compared to 4% for whites, the monthly household income for blacks was R 779 compared to R 4679 for whites and as many as 58% of black households earned less than R 700 a month. The resulting high level of rural-urban migration, the rise in the urban crime rate and the rapidly increasing scale of violence related to socio-economic causes, are putting severe strains on the political and civil structures of South Africa. High expectations of the majority of South Africans for quick and effective responses to these problems are foreseen to put serious pressure on a democratically elected government with only limited resources at its disposal.

III. CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

27. The mission offered the delegation of the Special Committee a unique opportunity to meet and establish direct personal contacts with a cross-section of South Africans in leadership position both public and private, to learn about the ongoing process of transition and to exchange ideas. The experience gained will unquestionably enrich the understanding of the Special Committee against Apartheid of political developments in South Africa, and its continued work. Various groups thanked the Special Committee against Apartheid for its positive role in creating an international opinion against apartheid in South Africa and for the support it had given to the liberation movements during the difficult years of their struggle. Its support, since the beginning of multi-party negotiations in 1991, for the process of peaceful change as a whole, was noted and appreciated. In general, there was pronounced willingness by all parties to meet with the mission and to cooperate with the Special Committee.

28. Considering the views expressed in the course of the mission's visit to South Africa, it is the understanding of the mission that the process of change through peaceful negotiations is still fragile and needs a more active support by the international community. This would be particularly important in three areas of special concern with regard to South Africa's immediate and medium term prospects for a stable transition to a non-racial democracy, namely the threat to the process posed by political violence; the need that one-man-one-vote elections be seen to be free and fair; and the need to facilitate the full participation of a new South Africa in international cooperation and in particular with regard to assistance for the reconstruction of its economy.

IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

29. The following is recommended:

- a. The number and mandate of the present United Nations observers should be expanded to enable them to play a more active role in containing violence.
- b. The United Nations needs to begin examining immediately the requirements as to functions and capabilities of international electoral monitors in South Africa. Consideration should be given to the fact that for the effective monitoring of the election process as a whole, deployment would need to begin several months in advance of the actual elections. Effective coordination with the national election commission (envisaged as a component of a transitional executive council), with the National Peace Accord structures and with already deployed international observers would be essential.
- c. The nature of the United Nations Observer Mission in South Africa could perhaps be modified to become "United Nations Transition Mission in South Africa" with a view to promoting and assisting, as requested, the multi-party negotiations; assisting the National Peace Accord structures in investigating violence; and monitoring of the elections process, including its technical preparations, and the conduct of the election campaign.
- d. The international community can assist in voter education with regard to democratic core values and political tolerance. The Special Committee against Apartheid intends to contribute to responding to this need by co-sponsoring a seminar in this area to take place in Cape Town in July 1993.

- e. There is an urgent need for the relevant bodies and agencies of the United Nations system to start detailed planning for programmes of socio-economic assistance coordinated with other international agencies, particularly in the health, housing, education, and employment sectors. Such programmes are crucial for the ability of a new democratically elected non-racial government to begin meeting the high expectations of a majority of the population, and thereby to help ensuring a stable and smooth transition.
- f. Urgent consideration should be given to convening a resource mobilization conference enabling a new government, following one-man-one-vote elections, to immediately begin programmes, in cooperation with international agencies, of tangible change for disadvantaged South Africans.
- g. Following one-man-one-vote elections and the establishment of a non-racial government and a constituent assembly/interim parliament, the General Assembly would need to consider the question of a resumption of the participation of South Africa in its work. In this context, the General Assembly may wish to consider holding a special session to evaluate such communication as may have been received from a new government with regard to the question of South Africa's resumption of its seat at the General Assembly.

APPENDIX

List of meetings held by the Team

Monday, 1 March 1993
(Johannesburg)

Meetings with: Chairman of the National Peace Committee-Mr. John Hall; Special Representative of the OAU Secretary General-Ambassador Legwaila J.M.J. Legwaila; Deputy Chief of Mission of UNOMSA-Mr. Ismat Steiner; and Mr. Clarence Makwetu, President of the Pan Africanist Congress of Azania (PAC)

Tuesday, 2 March 1993
(Johannesburg)

Meetings with: Representatives of the Consultative Business Movement (CBM); ANC delegation headed by its National Chairman, Mr. Oliver Tambo; Former Chairman of the Democratic Party, Mr. F. Van Zyl Slabbert; and the Chief Editor of The Star, Mr. Richard Steyn, and a group of senior media representatives.

Wednesday, 3 March 1993
(Johannesburg)

Meetings with: Chairman of the National Peace Secretariat, Mr. Antonie Gildenhuys; and the Chairman of the Commission of Inquiry into Public Violence and Intimidation, Justice Richard Goldstone.

Thursday, 4 March 1993
(Johannesburg)

Meetings with: Dr. Alex Boraine, Executive Director, IDASA; the Minister for Constitutional Development and Communication, Mr. Roelf Meyer; and the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Mr. R.F. Botha.

Friday, 5 March 1993
(Cape Town)

Meetings with: Representatives of the CBM; representatives of The Black Sash; Mr. Jan Steyn (outgoing Chairman), Professor Wiseman Nkuhlu (incoming Chairman), Professor and other representatives of Independent Development Trust (IDT); Archbishop Desmond Tutu; Ambassadors of Canada, Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and the USA, and Dr. Allan Boesak, Chairman of ANC, Western Cape.

Sunday, 7 March 1993
(Cape Town)

Meeting with: Mr. Z.J. De Beer, leader of the Democratic Party.

Monday, 8 March 1993
(Durban)

Meetings with: Dr. Oscar O. Dhlomo, Executive Chairman, and other representatives of Institute of Multi-party Democracy (MPD); Dr. Jairam Reddy, Vice-Chancellor, University of Durban-Westville; Representatives of the Legal Resources Centre.

Tuesday, 9 March 1993
(Ulundi)

Meeting with Dr. Mangosuthu G. Buthelezi, President, Chief Minister of Kwazulu, President of IFP.

Wednesday, 10 March 1993
(Johannesburg)

Meetings with: Dr. Nelson Mandela, President of ANC; representatives of the South African Institute for Race Relations; Rev. Frank Chikane, South African Council of Churches; Ms. Nadine Gordimer, Nobel Laureate in Literature; Mr. Sam Ramsamy, President, National Olympic Committee of South Africa; Mr.

Jay Naidoo, President, and other
representatives of COSATU.

Thursday, 11 March 1993 Meetings with: General André Pruis, South
(Johannesburg) African Police; Ambassador J.B. Shearar
Deputy Director-General, Ministry for
Foreign Affairs; Prof. John Barratt,
Director, and other representatives of
the South African Institute of
International Affairs; Mr. Gora A.
Ebrahim, Foreign Secretary of PAC.

NOTES

1. Resolution S-16/1 of 14 December 1989
2. The Abolition of Racially Based Land Measures Act, No. 108, of 1991, adopted in June 1991, annulled the Group Areas Act, No. 36, of 1996 the Black Land Act, No. 27, of 1913, the Development Trust and Land Act, No. 18, of 1936, and the Black Communities Development Act, No. 4, of 1984. In June 1991, the South African Parliament adopted the Population Registration Act Repeal Act, No. 114, of 1991, which legalised marked the end of the race classification in South Africa.
3. S/24389



Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/25896
8 June 1993

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Following consultations with the members of the Security Council, the President of the Council made the following statement, on behalf of the Council, at its 3230th meeting, on 8 June 1993, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Cambodia".

"The Security Council strongly condemns the armed attack against a Pakistani platoon and another against a Malaysian platoon of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC), both on 7 June 1993. In the first incident, two Pakistani personnel were injured, one of them seriously; in the second, three Malaysian personnel were injured, one of them seriously.

"The Security Council takes note of the Secretariat's preliminary report that the first attack was launched against the Pakistani compound by the National Army of Democratic Kampuchea (NADK); the identity of the attackers in the second incident has not yet been determined. It requests the Secretary-General to investigate further and to report urgently to the Council.

"The Security Council demands that those responsible for the attacks cease immediately all attacks against UNTAC and reiterates its warning that it will take appropriate measures against those who are threatening the safety and security of UNTAC personnel and are trying to overturn the democratic process in Cambodia through violence."
